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Abstract: Commonly, assurance is considered as ―something said or done to inspire confidence‖. It 
is clear from this definition that the fundamental part of assurance is confidence. However, the level 
of confidence inspired from a statement or an action depends on the ―quality‖ of its source. Inspired 
by the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) and the Common 
Criteria, we tailored five ordinal levels of quality levels for probes performing the verification of 
system security measures; different levels of quality being possible depending on the coverage, rigor, 
depth and Independence of the verification. The metric taxonomy is intended to assist IT Products 
manufacturers in developing their products or systems and in identifying security requirements to be 
satisfied for their products or systems to be assured at some level of quality as far as assurance 
evaluation is concerned. It could also benefit consumers in supporting them in selecting IT security 
products depending on their organizational needs, while IT security evaluators may use it as reference 
when forming judgments about the quality of a security product.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, reliance on technology is 
increasing quicker than the ability to deal 
with the also increasing threats to 
information security. It is therefore 
important for stakeholders (Users, system 
administrators, database administrators, 
etc...) to know if their systems are 
susceptible to threats and if they can be 
trusted. Although, some of the 
stakeholders are not particularly interested 
in the details of the technology and how 
security solutions are deployed, they want 
assurance. In other words, they need some 
quantifiable evidence that the security 
measures put in place to countermeasure 
security risks have been correctly deployed 
and work as intended. In general, the 
verification of the correctness of in place 
security measures is performed by either 
security auditors or by dedicated software 
probes, as it is becoming more and more 
the case in this day and age for operational 
systems. In any case, it can be agreed that 
the level of expertise of the auditor plays a 
key role in the effectiveness of the audit 
and, so is the ―quality‖ level of the 
software probe. This assertion calls for the 
elucidation of the quality levels that can be 
achieved and the requirements to be 
assured at a certain level of quality with 
respect to security assurance. This paper 
proposes to adapt the System Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model 
levels (SSE-CMM, 1999) to represent the 
possible levels achievable by a probe and 
some of the Common Criteria‘s families 
(ISO/IEC 15408, 2006) as quality 
requirements pertinent to assurance. As a 
matter of fact, the Common Criteria (CC) 
philosophy of assurance asserts that 
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greater assurance results from the 
application of greater evaluation effort, 
and that the goal is to apply the minimum 
effort required to provide the necessary 
level of assurance. The increasing level of 
effort is based upon:   
1. Coverage of the verification : The 
effort is greater because a larger 
portion of the IT product is 
included in the verification 
2. Depth: The effort is greater 
because it is deployed to a finer 
level of  design and 
implementation detail. 
3. Rigor: The effort is greater 
because the verification is applied 
in a more structured, formal 
manner.  
 
Table 1 reviews the quality levels and their 
associated descriptions. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses related work. Section 3 develops 
the quality metric taxonomy while in 
section 4 we highlight the relationship 
between confidence level and probe 
quality level. Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
The CC describes a framework in which 
developers can specify their security 
requirements and testing laboratories can 
evaluate the products to determine if they 
actually meet the claimed security. In other 
words, the CC provides assurance that the 
process of specification, implementation 
and evaluation of a computer security 
product has been conducted in a rigorous 
and standard manner. Part 3 defines the 
assurance requirements both for the 
development environment and for the 
product itself as well as the tasks for the 
evaluator. These assurance requirements 
are organized in classes, then in families of 
components, which cover functional 
specification and design descriptions, 
testing, life cycle management, delivery 
procedures, security of the development 
environment, vulnerability analysis, etc. 
Developers can either build up their own 
consistent assurance package or use one of 
the seven predefined Evaluation Assurance 
Levels (EAL). EAL1 to EAL7 provide an 
increasing scale that balances the level of 
assurance obtained on the product security 
with the cost and feasibility of acquiring 
that degree of assurance.  Another 
approach that was built upon the CC to 
probe the security of operational systems 
is BUGYO (Bulut et al., 2007). Unlike the 
Capability Level 0 – Not 
Performed 
The quality of the verification process is unknown  
Capability Level 1 - 
Performed Informally 
The verification process of the safeguards may not be rigorously 
undertaken nor planned and tracked.  A human expert who relies on 
individual knowledge on the safeguard may perform it. 
Capability Level 2 – 
structurally performed 
A specific procedure for the evaluation is available and is carried out. 
The evaluation process conforms to specified standards and 
requirements with provision of appropriate tools to perform the 
process.  
Capability Level 3 – 
Structured and Independent 
verification   
Verifications are performed according to a well-defined process using 
approved standard or tools provided by third party.  
Capability Level 4 – Semi 
complete verification  
The verification follows a well-defined process with a usage of 
software tools that cover most of the relevant part of the security 
measure. 
Capability Level 5 – 
Complete verification  
The maturity of the verification is such that all known relevant part of 
the safeguard are investigated appropriately in depth as well as in 
breadth  
Table 1. Probes quality levels and description  
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 CC, BUGYO proposed five levels of 
assurance while casting doubt on the 
practical use of the Common Criteria‘s 
level 6 and 7.  Nonetheless, one of the 
similarities between the two approaches 
lies on the fact that the metric taxonomy 
used is purely dedicated to working out the 
assurance level of an IT system or its 
components. Other taxonomy proposed in 
the literature includes Vaughn‘s (Vaughn 
et.al. 2003), Savola‘s (Savola, 2007) 
Seddigh‘s (Seddigh et al. 2004).  Our work 
distinguishes itself from the above by 
proposing a metric taxonomy that aims at 
gauging the quality level of the assurance 
evaluating probe.  This is relevant since a 
clear correlation exists between the 
evaluating probe quality and the result 
achieved. Highly qualitative probes will 
provide more accurate results which can 
be relied upon. 
The next section is dedicated to the 
elucidation of the probe quality taxonomy. 
 
3. Probe Quality Metric Taxonomy 
 
3.1 Structure of the probe Quality 
metric Taxonomy: 
 
The matrix shown in table 2 expresses the 
minimum requirements to achieve certain 
quality level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                  Table2. Probe quality metric taxonomy 
 
 
To that extent, considering a probe, which 
quality evaluation provided results 
represented by I(coverage= x, Depth=y 
,Rigor= z, Independence of verification= t),  
satisfies quality level k if all the parameters 
(Coverage, Depth, Rigor and independence 
of verification) capability for I are greater  
or equal to the corresponding parameters 
for QLk. The matrix indicates that in order 
for a probe to be at level 3 of quality for 
instance, at least the following requirements 
should be satisfied: 
  - QAM_COV.2                      - QAM_RIG.2  
  - QAM_DPT.2                       - QAM_IND.2  
The rationale for the structure of the matrix 
in table is provided in section 3.2. The  
subsequent presentation of the probe quality 
classes follows the example set by the 
Common Criteria and more precisely the 
structure of the class ATE: tests, which 
emphasizes on confirmation that the Target 
Security Function or TSF ( in Common 
Criteria terminology) operates according to 
its design descriptions. The ATE: Tests class 
Class Family and meaning                Quality Level: QL 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QAM: 
Probe  
Quality  
Metric 
QAM_COV: Coverage (Larger coverage of 
the verified security measure  provides more 
confidence on the results about its status) 
1 2 2 2 3 
QAM_DPT: Depth (A detailed verification 
of the security measure will decrease the 
likelihood of undiscovered errors.) 
1 2 2 3 4 
QAM_RIG: Rigor (The more structured the 
evaluation of the deployed security measure, 
the more reliable the outcome of the 
verification ) 
1 2 2 2 2 
QAM_IND : Independent Verification ( 
verification performed by a third party 
evaluator or software tool provides more 
assurance) 
1 1 2 2 3 
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separates testing into developer testing and 
evaluator testing. The Coverage 
(ATE_COV) and Depth (ATE_DPT) 
families address the completeness of 
developer testing. Coverage (ATE_COV) 
addresses the rigor with which the functional 
specification is tested; Depth (ATE_DPT) 
addresses whether testing against other 
design descriptions (security architecture, 
TOE design, and implementation 
representation) is required.   
Functional tests (ATE_FUN) addresses the 
performing of the tests by the developer and 
how this testing should be documented. 
Finally, Independent testing (ATE_IND) 
addresses evaluator testing: whether the 
evaluator should repeat part or all of the 
developer testing and how much 
independent testing the evaluator should do. 
We tailored these families to represent the 
characteristics of the evaluating probe by 
making the following mapping: 
 ATE_COV subdivided into three 
capabilities  and QAM_COV 
 ATE_DPT subdivided into four 
capabilities and QAM_DPT 
 ATE_FUN subdivided into two 
capabilities and QAM_RIG 
 ATE_IND subdivided into three 
capabilities and QAM_IND 
The metric construction class and the 
families associated are next described. For 
each family, a description of its 
dependencies and components are provided. 
Figure 1 describes the quality families and 
their associated capabilities. The 
components are hierarchical and, if not 
otherwise specified, higher-level 
components include the lower levels. 
 
                                             Figure1. Metric families and capabilities 
 
    MC: Metric 
construction 
QAM_COV: Coverage 
1 2 3 
QAM_RIG: Rigor of verification 1 2 3 
1 2 3 QAM_REL: Reliability 4 
4 1 2 3 
QAM_DPT: Depth 
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 QAM_COV: Coverage 
The coverage (scope) family indicates that 
the more elements of the security measure 
are verified by the probe, the more it can be 
assumed that the metric result represents the 
security measure. The objective of this 
component is to confirm that all relevant 
parameters of the security measure have 
been verified. 
 
Component leveling 
QAM_COV: Coverage  1 2 3 
 
 
Dependency: QAM_DPT  
The analysis of the coverage shall 
demonstrate that all key aspects of the 
security measure have been completely 
verified. 
- QAM_COV.1 The verification process 
only targets specific areas of the 
deployed security measure not 
necessarily representative of its status.  
o A part not formally estimated 
regarding its importance, 
which contribute to the 
security measure correct 
functionality, is verified. 
- QAM_COV.2 Only some of the key 
areas of the security measure, known to 
be relevant for its well functioning are 
evaluated in the process 
o  A selection of the known 
important parts, as estimated 
by an expert, which 
contribute to the security 
measure correct functionality, 
are verified. 
- QAM_COV.3 All relevant aspects of the 
deployed security measure are verified 
in the evaluation process 
o All parts characterized as 
significant, by an expert, 
which contribute to the 
security measure correct 
functionality, are verified. 
 QAM_DPT: Depth 
The components in this family deal with the 
level of detail to which the security measure 
is verified by the probe and therefore 
minimizing the risk of missing an error in 
the security measure.  
Component leveling 
QAM_COV: Depth  1 2 3 4 
 
 
Dependency: QAM_COV 
- QAM_DPT.1: Evaluation of the 
security measure is done without a 
clear idea on how deep the 
verification is conducted. 
- QAM_DPT.2: High level 
verification of the security measure 
through its interface. 
- QAM_DPT.3: Most of the relevant 
modules of the security measure 
are verified during the evaluation 
Process. 
- QAM_DPT.4:  Detailed verification 
of the security measure is 
undertaken with the entire relevant 
modules assessed 
 QAM_RIG: Rigor of verification 
 The more structured the evaluation of the 
deployed security measure, the more reliable 
the outcome of the verification.  
 
Component leveling 
 
QAM_RIG: Rigor  1 2 
 
- QAM_RIG.1: The verification is 
undertaken by a human expert who is 
familiar with the deployed security 
measures. 
- QAM_RIG.2:  The verification 
process is structured and follows the 
requirements within a verification 
documentation or a standard.  
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o The verification is performed 
by a software tool 
 
 QAM_IND: Independent Verification  
The more independent the evaluation of the 
deployed security measure, the more reliable 
the outcome of the verification. In another 
words, performing the verification of the 
security measure one has deployed with a 
self developed tools is a self assessment 
exercise which cannot be too reliable.  
Component leveling 
 
QAM_IND: Independent 
verification 
 1 2 3 
 
 
Dependency: QAM_COV, QAM_DPT, 
QAM_RIG 
- QAM_IND.1: Verification is 
performed by probe developed 
internally 
o The verification is undertaken by a 
dedicated self-developed tool 
- QAM_IND.2: partial verification by 
independent probes available on the 
market 
o The verification is performed by a 
commercial or open source 
automated software tool but not all 
relevant parts of the security 
measure are verified. 
- QAM_IND.3: Complete verification 
by independent probes available on 
the market 
o The verification is performed by a 
commercial or open source 
automated software tool with all 
relevant parts of the security 
measure verified. 
 
3.2 Justifying the Probe Quality Matrix 
Structure and the Minimum Requirement 
for Achieving a Quality Level: 
 
The determination of the minimum 
requirement to satisfy a given quality level 
is made through consideration of the 
definition of the quality levels themselves,  
the positive correlation between quality 
levels and the families capability levels 
and finally the maximum capability of 
each family.  
According to the definition of the quality 
level 1 (QL1), the evaluation process is not 
structured and may be performed by a 
human expert. This suggest that for that 
level the Rigor family should be at least at 
capability level 1(refer to QAM_RIG.1 
description). When considering the 
definition of QL2 (structurally performed) 
one could see that a key element of 
improvement between QL1 and QL2 is that 
the verification becomes structured and at 
least a software tool is used, meaning that 
the Rigor family should be at least at level 2. 
Since the maximum capability level for that 
family is 2 and the fact that family‘s 
capabilities should be at least static when 
going up in quality level, the Rigor 
capability for QL3, QL4 and QL5 should be 
at capability level 2. We can therefore 
assume the following evolution trend for the 
Rigor family QAM_RIG from QL1 to QL5:  
QAM_RIG: Rigor  1 2 2 2 2 
 
One of the differences between QL2 and 
QL3 is that at the latter level, the 
verification is performed by a third party 
probe, making the verification more 
independent. Therefore the capability level 
for the Independent verification family 
(QAM_IND) is at least at 2 for QL3 and at 
level 1 for QL2. QL4 stipulates that the 
verification process is semi-complete i.e. 
although independent, the verification does 
not cover all the relevant parts of the 
security measure, which correspond to 
capability level 2 for the QAM_IND family. 
All these considerations, added to the 
correlation between the families capability 
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level and the probe quality level leads to the 
following evolution trend for the QAM_IND 
family from QL1 to QL5: 
QAM_IND: Independent 
verification 
 1 1 2 2 3 
 
QL5 is referred to as ―complete‖ 
verification, meaning that all known relevant 
parts and module of the security measure 
have been verified. This implies that the 
QAM_COV and QAM_DPT should be at 
their maximum capabilities, 3 and 4 
respectively. QL4 ―semi-complete‖ 
verification implies that at least the most 
relevant parts and modules of the security 
measure have been verified, which 
correspond to at least QAM_COV.2 and 
QAM_DPT.3.  The use of a software tool 
which is necessary for being at QL 2 would 
imply that the evaluator should know how 
deep the verification is being conducted and 
the components of the security measures 
concerned by the verification. This means 
QAM_DPT should be at least at capability 
level 2 for QL2. Similarly for QL3, 
QAM_DPT should be at least at level 2. The 
previous arguments hold for the QAM_COV 
family. The capability for that family for 
QL2 and QL3 should be at least 2. The 
capability evolution for QAM_COV and 
QAM_DPT from QL1 to QL5 are therefore 
as shown below: 
QAM_COV: Coverage  1 2 2 2 3 
 
             
QAM_DPT: Depth  1 2 2 3 4 
 
 
4.  Probe Quality Level and 
Confidence Level 
 
The quality of an assurance evaluation probe 
as defined in this paper influences one‘s 
confidence in the accuracy of the 
verification result achieved by the probe and 
subsequently   the security assurance value 
of  a system or its component. The quality 
level (QL) of a probe serves as a cap to the 
confidence level one can expect from using 
a certain type of probe. Thus, the 
verification of the correctness of a deployed 
security measure will be assigned the value 
QL if the security measure posture is found 
to be compliant with the security 
requirements specification while  zero ―0‖  
will be used to signify either that the 
compliance is a the lowest possible level or 
that the mismatch detected is critical for the 
system. Intermediate states will be assigned 
a discrete value within 0, QL  and classified 
depending on their gravity for the system. 
While conducting a security assurance 
evaluation of a Domain Name Server (DNS) 
a Samhain probe (Samhain, 2008), an open 
source host-based intrusion detection system 
using cryptographic checksums of files to 
detect modifications, has been used for the 
verification. An effective functioning of that 
probe helps detect the address resolution 
files integrity being corrupted as a result of 
any malicious attack. Based on information 
obtained from the Samhain documentation 
and by comparing the quality metric 
taxonomy and the specification in table 2, 
we derived the following conclusions:  
Coverage of the measures:  The coverage 
of the Samhain measurements satisfies 
QAM_COV.2. In fact the measures only 
represent a static behavior of the service and 
not a dynamic network view (in and 
outgoing flows from and to the DNS server). 
Depth of the measures: The measures 
undertaken by the Samhain target the 
address resolution file. This is good because 
a missing address resolution file or a bad 
content is relevant to the correct DNS 
behavior. This satisfies at least 
QAM_DPT.3. 
Rigor of the measures:  Samhain is a 
dedicated open source integrity check 
software tool. (QAM_RIG.2) 
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Independence of verification:  A recent 
version (v2.4.5) was used with a continuous 
evolution of the dictionary. The main 
weaknesses of the DNS controlled. 
(QAM_IND.3) 
The values of the Samhain capabilities do 
not explicitly correspond to any of quality 
level of table 1. Nonetheless, all the 
parameters of the Samhain (Coverage :2, 
Depth:3, Rigor:2 and Independent 
verification:3) are greater or equal to those 
of  quality level 4,  while some are lower 
than those of quality level 5. We can here 
conclude that the Samhain probe 
corresponds to quality level 4. 
Taking into account the quality level of the 
Samhain (level 4) and the possible results 
obtain from the Samhain (detection of 
possible malicious change) and the self-
developed script (configuration errors); the 
confidence level on the conformity of the 
DNS (depending on the gravity of the 
security breach in the expert view) can be 
summarized as follows: If the address 
resolution files integrity is compromised:  
 Corrupted files: An evil-minded 
modification then the confidence on the 
conformity level is 0. 
 In case of corrupted files and errors 
(configuration errors), the confidence on 
the conformity level is 1. 
 Otherwise, if everything is fine the 
confidence on conformity level is 4. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented a probe 
quality metric taxonomy with respect to 
assurance evaluation. The probe quality 
taxonomy is part of a wider framework for 
the evaluation of operational systems 
security assurance that we developed. 
Regarding future work we envisage the 
implementation of the taxonomy so to 
enable an automatic decision on probes 
quality levels. A wider application of the 
taxonomy on more and diverse type of 
probes is plan to judge on its effectiveness 
and also for possible enhancement.   
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